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A TALE OF TWO CURFEWS (AND ONE CITY):
WHAT DO TWO WASHINGTON, D.C. JUVENILE CURFEWS SAY
ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA COURTS AND THE CONFUSION OVER
JUVENILE CURFEWS EVERYWHERE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In light of this nation's long relationship with juvenile curfews, one
would think that the related constitutional issues before so many American courts would have been resolved long ago.' After all, United States
cities began implementing juvenile curfews over a century ago. 2 In fact,
1. See Brian Privor, Dusk Til' Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness ofJuvenile Curfew Ordinances,79 B.U. L. REv. 415, 418 (1999) (noting that many state and

federal courts have reviewed curfews over past fifty years); see also Craig Hemmens
& Katherine Bennett, Out in the Street: Juvenile Crime,Juvenile Curfews, and the Constitution, 34 GONZ. L. REv. 267, 279 (1998-99) ("The most common curfew target in
this country has been juveniles."); Brian J. Lester, Is It Too Late forJuvenile Curfews?
Qutb Logic and the Constitution, 25 HorsTRA L. REv. 665, 668 (1996) (noting that
during late 1800s, urban crime was thought to stem from lack of parental responsibility exhibited by large numbers of immigrant families entering United States).
Throughout this Comment, "curfew," 'juvenile curfew" and "ordinance" refer
to "[a] law (commonly an ordinance) which imposes on people (particularly children) the obligation to remove themselves from the streets on or before a certain
time of night." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 381 (6th ed. 1990). Further, the terms
"juvenile" and "minor" are used interchangeably to refer to persons affected by
nocturnal juvenile curfews.
2. See Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. 1898) (invalidating
curfew). In fact, juvenile curfews really gained popularity around the year 1900,
when about 3000 municipalities had adopted such restrictions. See Note, Assessing
the Scope of Minors'FundamentalRights:JuvenileCurfews and the Constitution,97 HARv.
L. REv. 1163, 1164 n.9 (1984) (noting growth trend in curfews around turn of
century); see alsoJeff A. Beaumont, Nunez and Beyond: An Examination of Nunez v.
City of San Diego and the Future of NocturnalJuvenileCurfew Ordinances,19 J. Juv. L.
84, 121 (1998) (describing great proliferation of nocturnal juvenile curfews); Sue
Anne Pressley, Nightly Youth Curfews: Clamping Down Across America, WASH. POST,
July 13, 1994, at Al (noting more current growth in finding that "over less than
five years, officials in nearly 1000 jurisdictions across America ... have chosen the
controversial method [of juvenile curfews] .as a way of fighting fear with formal
action, of trying to regain some measure of control over a society where family
values seem to be slipping").
One commentator describes the ebb and flow of curfew legislation as follows:
Public demand for curfews has surged and subsided in waves, coinciding
with the country's most dramatic periods of crime and social transformation. During the late nineteenth century, racism and fear drove the public to adopt curfews on incoming immigrants and their children. In the
1940s, the number of curfews in U.S. cities rose significantly in response
to the wartime period's increasing problems ofjuvenile delinquency. Another surge of interest in curfews came during the 1970s in the face of
sharp increases in violent urban crime. Until recently, such laws were so
rarely enforced that they appeared to be forgotten sections of many local
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President Benjamin Harrison once characterized juvenile curfews as "the
most important municipal regulation for the protection of the children of
American homes."' 3 Nevertheless, the constitutional issues surrounding ju4
venile curfews are anything but well settled.
criminal laws. During the past decade, however, local concerns about juvenile violence and gang-related activity have rekindled interest in curfews directed primarily at youth activity.
Gregory Z. Chen, Note, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 134 (1997) (citations omitted).
3. Note, Curfew Ordinancesand the Control of NocturnalJuvenile Crime, 107 U. PA.
L. REv. 66, 66 n.5 (1958) (citing 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 306 (3d ed. 1957)).
Further, a 1957 study revealed that more than fifty percent of all cities with populations exceeding 100,000 had juvenile curfews on their books. See id. at 68-69
(describing study).
4. The following courts found juvenile curfew ordinances unconstitutional:
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981); Naprstek
v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586
F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046
(D.N.H. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982); In re Frank 0.,
247 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Alves v.Justice Ct., 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957); K.L.J. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); S.W. v. State,
431 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); W.J.W. v. State, 356 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); In reJohn Doe, 513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 1973); City of Maquoketa v.
Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992); Brown v. Asheton, 611 A.2d 599 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992), cert. granted, 615 A.2d 262 (1992), and vacated, 660 A.2d 447
(1992); City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 536 N.E.2d 67 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987); In re
Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio Ct. C. P. 1978); Hayes v. Mun. Court of Okla. City,
487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); ExparteMcCarver, 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1898); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973); Waters v.
Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478
(NJ. Super. 1987).
The following courts found their respective juvenile curfews constitutional:
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993); Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown,
401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); affd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976); In re
Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct..App. 1972); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498
(Cal. Ct. App. 1945); In reJ.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); People v.
Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. 1976); Vill. of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989);
Thistiewood v. Trial Magistrate, Worcester County, 204 A.2d 688 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1964); In re Carpenter, 287 N.E.2d 399 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972); City of Eastlake
v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966); Baker v. Steelton Borough, 17
Dauphin County Rep. 17 (Pa. C. 1912); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329
(Wis. 1988).
Juvenile curfews are actually distant relatives of the general emergency curfews that have been enacted in the past. See Privor, supra note 1, at 426 (noting
relationship of curfews). Absent an emergency such as a war, natural disaster or
period of civil uprising, these curfews have generally been struck down. See id.
(noting lack of success of non-juvenile curfews); see also United States v. Chalk, 441
F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1971) (upholding curfew imposed after riot between
police and African-American high school students); People v. McKelvy, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1972) (finding that "clear showing of emergent necessity"
engendered by race riots justified curfew); Davis v.Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409,
414 (Ct. App. 1970) (upholding curfew enacted in response to riots at housing
project); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 925 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967) (upholding curfew
when city threatened by riotous behavior); Glover v. D.C., 250 A.2d 556, 559-60
(D.C. 1969) (upholding curfew that excluded all persons except police, firefight-
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The United States Supreme Court has never established specific constitutional standards for assessing the validity of juvenile curfews. 5 As a
result, lower courts have been left with no central guidance in evaluating
the constitutionality of these restrictive ordinances. 6 In turn, it is hardly
surprising that the decisions of individual courts are significantly inconsis7
tent regarding many constitutional issues.
For example, courts have disagreed on whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect a fundamental right of juveniles to move
freely on the streets at night absent adult supervision, as well as whether
parents have a fundamental right to allow their children to be on the
streets without their supervision. 8 Moreover, even those courts that have
ers, medical personnel and sanitation workers from streets as reasonable and usual
police regulation in response to riotous conditions throughout city); Municipal
Court v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193, 194-95 (Fla. 1971) (invalidating curfew enacted by
mayor because only city commission had power to issue curfew during emergencies); Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 189 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Mich. 1971) (finding
that during periods of civil unrest, city may not issue curfew absent action by governor because state action preempts city action under such circumstances); State v.
Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d 449, 456-59 (N.C. 1971) (determining that emergency curfew
was valid use of police power when city faced riotous conditions); Ervin v. State,
163 N.W.2d 207, 210-11 (Wis. 1978) (upholding curfew imposed to restore order
after riots). For a general discussion of juvenile curfews, see Danny R. Veilleux,
J.D., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Juvenile Curfew Regulations, 83
A.L.R. 4th FED. 1056 (1991).
5. See Bykovsky, 429 U.S. at 965 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[t]he prior decisions of the Court provide no clear answer" for lower courts); see also Chen, supra
note 2, at 139-49 (discussing past seventy years of United States Supreme Court
case law on minors' rights with respect to relations between minors, parents and
states).
6. See Privor, supra note 1, at 418 ("[T] he Supreme Court has denied review in
this area, depriving the lower courts of much needed guidance.").
7. Compare Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 951 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding juvenile curfew unconstitutional), with Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,
159 F.3d 843, 855 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding juvenile curfew constitutional).
8. Compare Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(finding that juveniles do not have fundamental right to be on streets late at night
without adult supervision), with Gaffney v. Allentown, No. CIV. A. 97-4455, 1997
WL 597989, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (finding thatjuveniles have full fundamental right to move freely on par with rights of adults).
To determine whether a right is fundamental and deserving of strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, courts look to whether the right in question
has its source, either explicitly or implicitly, within the Constitution. See Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982) (determining whether class-based denial of
particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (finding that right is fundamental when it is "deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and tradition"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (holding that right is fundamental when explicitly or implicitly protected by Constitution); Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937) (finding that rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are fundamental), overruled by Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Among those freedoms determined to be fundamental under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are the rights to marry, make personal family choices,
have an abortion, make procreation decisions, travel from one state to another
and vote. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (protecting right to
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found at least one fundamental right under equal protection or substantive due process analysis have utilized the applicable constitutional standards with differing results. 9 Furthermore, differences between the courts
have not been limited to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 10
There are other issues that have suffered from inconsistent treatment.1 1 One such issue concerns whether juvenile curfews infringe upon
juveniles' First Amendment freedoms. 12 In dealing with the First Amendment, some courts have found that juvenile curfews do not infringe upon
First Amendment rights, while other courts have determined that juvenile
curfews unconstitutionally encumber First Amendment freedoms. 13 Even
among those courts that have found an impermissible infringement of the
First Amendment, there are inconsistencies in the courts' determinations
14
of how the curfews infringed on the juveniles' freedoms.
In response to these shifting approaches, this Comment removes a
significant variable from the constitutional analysis of juvenile curfews.
That variable is location. By removing the issue of location, it becomes
easier to compare and contrast the courts' analysis of the curfews because
the factual background underlying each curfew is the same. 15 Therefore,
marry); Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (protecting personal choice in family matter); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (preserving right to abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (protecting right relating to procreation); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (protecting right to interstate travel), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 657 (1974); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (protecting right to vote).
9. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1140 (finding curfew unconstitutional
under strict scrutiny standard), with Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496 (finding curfew constitutional despite application of strict scrutiny standard).
10. See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180-81 (D. Conn. 1999)
(identifying challenges based on First Amendment, Fourth Amendment and
vagueness grounds in addition to equal protection argument); Nunez v. City of
San Diego, 963 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (noting challenges based on
First and Fourth Amendments), rev'd, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
11. Compare Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 852-53 (finding that curfew complies with
requirements of First Amendment), and Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541-44 (same), with
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 951 (finding that curfew violates First Amendment), and Waters,
711 F. Supp. at 1134 (same).
12. Compare Schleifer, 59 F.3d at 852-53 (finding that curfew complies with requirements of First Amendment), with Nunez, 114 F.3d at 951 (finding that curfew
violates First Amendment).
13. Compare Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1260
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (stating that "it is apparent that the curfew ordinance.., does not
unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment right of minors to gather on
public streets for political, religious, or expressive purposes"), withJohnson v. Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072-73 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (determining that juvenile curfew violated minors' First Amendment rights).
14. Compare Nunez, 114 F.3d at 950-51 (finding that limitations on freedom of
movement infringe upon established First Amendment freedoms), with Waters, 711
F. Supp. at 1134 (determining that freedom of movement, in itself, is First Amendment right).
15. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1127 (explaining that Emergency Act restricted juveniles under eighteen years of age and that curfew was aimed at unprec-
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the only differences that remain lie in the curfews themselves, and the
courts' reactions to those differences.1 6 In pursuit of a comparison void of
environmental inconsistencies, this Comment examines two opposing
United States District Court for the District of Columbia juvenile curfew
decisions, Waters v. Barry' 7 and Hutchins v. Districtof Columbia.'8 This Comment then concludes by choosing, from a constitutional standpoint, the
superior of the two decisions.
II.

BACKGROUND

The foundations of juvenile curfew challenges across the nation are
remarkably consistent on a basic level in that almost all curfew ordinances
face challenges under the First, Fourth and Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 19 Nevertheless, these initial similarities lessen when the cases are
20
examined beyond the basic nature of their constitutional challenges.
A.

Two Similar Curfews

In order to fully explain the succeeding constitutional comparisons, it
is essential to establish the facts and backgrounds of the two principal
cases, Waters and Hutchins. The Waters case was decided in 1989, approximately ten years before Hutchins.21 In Waters, the plaintiffs consisted of
minor and near-minor residents of Washington D.C., a few of the minors'
edented explosion of violence in Washington, D.C. resulting from drug trade and
problems of social inequity), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534 (explaining that Curfew
Act restricted juveniles under sixteen years of age and that curfew was aimed at
increasing violence associated with juveniles in Washington D.C.).
16. See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1125 (focusing on curfew in Washington
D.C.); Hutchins, 1999 WL 397429 at *1 (same).

17. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
18. 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
19. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535 (same); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,
159 F.3d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1998) (dealing with First and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1128 (including challenges based on First,
Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp.
1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (same); see also Beaumont, supra note 2, at 93
("[O]pponents often challenge the constitutionality ofjuvenile curfews on several
grounds, including violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.").
20. Compare Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 950-51 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that limitations on freedom of movement infringe upon established First
Amendment freedoms), with Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (determining that freedom of movement, in itself, is First Amendment right). CompareQutb v. Strauss, 11
F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that juveniles do have fundamental right to
free movement), with Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847 (determining that juveniles do not
have fundamental right to free movement on par with adults).
21. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 531 (stating date of decision as June 18, 1999);
Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1125 (stating date of decision as May 24, 1989). The Council of the District of Columbia approved the Act on April 4, 1989, and Mayor

Marion Barry signed the Act into law on April 14, 1989. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at
1127 n.1 (noting approval dates).
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parents and citizens affiliated with religious organizations.2 2 These groups
collectively challenged the District's Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of
23
1989, No. 8-325 ("Emergency Act").
The Emergency Act made it illegal for minors below the age of eigh24
teen to be on the streets between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
In the event of a violation of the ordinance, the Emergency Act imposed
sanctions on the juveniles and fines for their parents. 25 To justify enforcement of these restrictions, the Emergency Act included stated objectives
that were to "reduce the incidence of juvenile violence, both against and
by juveniles, to reduce juveniles' exposure to drug trafficking and other
criminal activity, and to aid parents and others responsible for juveniles in
carrying out their supervisory obligations." 26 In addition, the Emergency
Act also contained a number of limited exceptions, one of which lifted the
effect of the restriction when the juvenile was returning on a direct route
27
from a pre-registered religious or other non-profit activity.
Another exception exempted minors engaged in legitimate employment activity as long as the minor carried proof of identification. 2 8 Despite the express objectives and limited exceptions, the plaintiffs argued
that if the Emergency Act were enforced, the regulation would infringe
upon their First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 29 The district court
22. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1127-28 (establishing identity of plaintiffs).
23. See id. (explaining actions taken by plaintiffs).
24. See id. at 1127 (describing scope of curfew). Commentators have described juvenile curfews as resulting from a dual focus. See Privor, supra note 1, at
423 (noting two-pronged concern). One commentator explains the dual focus in

stating as follows: "First, policymakers take action in response to a public outcry
regarding a perceived increase in juvenile crime ....
Second, community wide
concern for juvenile victims exists ....
As a result, curfew legislation focuses on

both prevention of youth-perpetrated crimes and avoidance of youth victimization." Id.
25. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1141-42 (describing enforcement provisions).
Such provisions that allow for the levying of fines against the parents of juveniles
that violate a curfew are not unusual. See Peter Applebome, Parents Face Consequences as Childrens'MisdeedsRise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al ("In 1995 alone,
at least 10 states from New Hampshire to Louisiana to Oregon passed so-called
parental responsibility laws calling for fines or sometimes imprisonment.").
26. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1127.
27. See id. at 1141 (noting registration exception).
28. See id. (describing employment exception). The Emergency Act also included exceptions for minors traveling in a motor vehicle, minors accompanied by
a parent, and minors moved by reasonable necessity to carry out emergency errands. See id. at 1141-42 (expanding on available exceptions).
29. See id. at 1128 (noting constitutional challenges). Prior to the district
court's decision, the plaintiffs first challenged the Short Term Curfew Emergency
Act of 1989, a predecessor to the Act that the city council had approved on February 28, 1989. See id. at 1128 n.4 (noting initial challenge). The district court then
enjoined enforcement of the Emergency Act on March 20, 1989. See id. (establishing date that Emergency Act was enjoined). Following the court's action, the
Council produced the Act, which repealed the Emergency Act; whereupon, the
plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a challenge to the newly formed Act.
See id. (explaining inception of Act). As a result, the plaintiffs had secured a tem-
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283

agreed with regard to the First and Fifth Amendment challenges and as a
30
result, the Emergency Act was struck down.
Six years later, the District of Columbia City Council decided to impose another juvenile curfew.3 1 In an attempt to stem the tide of both
juvenile crime and victimization, the D.C. City Council unanimously
adopted the Juvenile Curfew Act of 199532 ("Curfew Act"). 33 The Curfew
Act barred juveniles under the age of seventeen from being in a public
place without parental or equivalent adult supervision from 11:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. on Sunday through Thursday and from 12:00 p.m. until 6:00
34
a.m. on Friday and Saturday.
Like its predecessor, the Emergency Act, the Curfew Act placed some
responsibility in the hands of parents or guardians. 35 Under the Curfew
Act, a parent or guardian commits an offense "by knowingly permitting, or
36
through insufficient control allowing, the minor to violate the curfew."
Unlike the Emergency Act, however, the Curfew Act establishes that owners, operators or employees can be found in violation if they knowingly
allow a minor to remain at their place of business during the curfew hours,
unless the minor refuses to leave the premises and the owner notifies the
37
proper authorities.
Another interesting facet of the Curfew Act is the scope of its exceptions, which are more detailed, numerous and expansive than those found
in the Emergency Act.3 8 The Curfew Act will not be violated if a minor is:
(1) running an errand without detour on behalf of the minor's parent,
guardian or caretaker; (2) accompanied by the minor's parent, guardian
or caretaker more than twenty years old, as authorized by the minor's parent; (3) commuting to or from a place of employment without any detour
or engaging in certain employment activities; (4) in a vehicle involved in
interstate travel; (5) on the sidewalk bordering the minor's or the nextdoor neighbor's residence, provided that the neighbor has not previously
complained to authorities; (6) involved in an emergency; (7) attending an
porary restraining order on April 20, 1989. See id. at 1128 (noting temporary restraining order).
30. See id. at 1140 (establishing court's holding)
31. See Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating
Curfew Act was enacted in 1995).
32. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2182(5).
33. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534 (noting adoption of ordinance).
34. See id. at 534-35 (explaining requirements of Curfew Act). A minor found
in violation of the Curfew Act can receive up to twenty-five hours of mandatory
community service. See id. The Curfew Act does not include judicially emancipated minors or married minors. See id. In order to have a violation, a police
officer must reasonably believe that the juvenile has committed an offense and that
there is no applicable defense. See id. The juvenile will then be released by the
police to a parent, guardian or person standing in loco parentis. See id.
35. See id. (noting parental liability).
36. Id.
37. See id. (establishing additional responsibility for violations).
38. See id. (noting exceptions).
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official school, religious or other recreational activity sponsored by the
District of Columbia, a civic organization, or another similar entity that
takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or from, without any detour
or stop, such an activity sponsored by adults; or (8) exercising First
Amendment rights, including free exercise of religion, freedom of speech
39
and the right to assembly.
Notwithstanding these exceptions, District of Columbia citizens challenged the Curfew Act on First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth
Amendment and vagueness grounds, and, as with the Emergency Act, the
district court agreed with the plaintiffs. 40 Unlike the treatment of the
Emergency Act, however, the circuit court reversed the district court, determining that the Curfew Act was constitutional. 41 A closer look at the
successful challenge of the Emergency Act and the unsuccessful challenge
of the Curfew Act reveals a tremendous degree of inconsistency between
42
the two decisions.
B.

Two Opposing Outcomes

One need not look far to find differences between the two opinions,
as the courts arrive at opposing conclusions on both the First and Fifth
Amendment issues. 43 With regard to the First Amendment, the district
court in Waters recognized that the First Amendment rights of District of
Columbia juveniles were infringed when they were denied the opportunity
to "(play] a late night game of basketball, to sit in the open air on a muggy
summer night, or to walk home... from a party at a friend's home .... 44
Furthermore, the district court made clear that when "a juvenile on a solitary, totally innocent excursion with parental permission, such as stargazing, [or] sitting on the sidewalk near his house" has violated an ordinance,
45
that ordinance is unconstitutional.
Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hutchins took a very different approach, stating that
39. See id. (documenting exceptions).
40. See id. at 535 (establishing challenges to Curfew Act).
41. See id. at 534 ("[T]he curfew implicates no fundamental rights of minors
or their parents. Even assuming the curfew does implicate such rights, we hold
that it survives strict scrutiny. And, it does not violate the First or Fourth Amendment rights of minors.").
42. Compare id. (finding that Curfew Act implicates no fundamental rights and
does not infringe upon juvenile First Amendment freedoms), with Waters v. Barry,
711 F. Supp. 1121, 1140 (D.D.C. 1989) (determining that Emergency Act violated
juveniles' First and Fifth Amendment rights).
43. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 ("[I]t is apparent that the [Emer
gency] Act involves such a wide and indiscriminate denial of the First and Fifth
Amendment rights of juveniles that it cannot be constitutionally applied."), with
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534 (finding no violation of Fifth Amendment or First
Amendment).
44. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1135.
45. Id. (citing McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H.
1984)).
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"[t] he curfew regulates the activities of juveniles during nighttime hours;
it does not, by its terms, regulate expressive conduct." 46 More specifically,
the court defined "expressive conduct" as those actions that intend to convey a particular message. 4 7 Further, the message must be likely to be understood by others.4 8 Therefore, even though this was a limited
narrowing of the exception, it seems apparent that the Curfew Act's First
Amendment exceptions do not include such activities as sitting outside on
a muggy summer night or stargazing. 49 Thus, the Waters court and the
Hutchins court adopted different interpretations of the rights available to
juveniles under the First Amendment. The inconsistencies, however, do
50
not stop there.
The respective court decisions are also at odds over how to apply the
Fifth Amendment substantive due process and equal protection requirements to juvenile curfews. 51 Under both standards, the real controversy
between the two decisions revolves around whether a fundamental right
exists for juveniles to move freely at all times. 52 This controversy is para46. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 548.
47. See id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 546 ("[I] t is perfectly clear that some activities, such as religious
worship and political protests, would be protected under the [First Amendment]
defense, and that other activities, such as rollerblading would not.").
50. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (establishing that Emergency Act
violated First Amendment), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 548 (finding no violation of
First Amendment).
51. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134-40 (determining that Emergency Act
infringed on fundamental right and violated Fifth Amendment substantive due
process and equal protection rights), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541-47 (finding no
infringement of fundamental right and no violation of Fifth Amendment substantive due process and equal protection rights).
Note that while the Fifth Amendment does not include an express equal protection clause, the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee includes an equal protection component. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal Protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
Also, A is important to recognize that within each opinion, the Waters and
Hutchins courts base their substantive due process and equal protection determinations on the same analysis of fundamental rights. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 536-41
(recognizing both substantive due process and equal protection challenges, but
performing only one juvenile fundamental rights analysis); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at
1132-40 (same). In turn, this Comment explains and compares the substantive
due process and equal protection challenges simultaneously and notes differences
when necessary.
52. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (recognizing fundamental right to
free movement for juveniles), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 536-39 (recognizing no
fundamental right to free movement for juveniles). The Hutchins court also discussed and dismissed an argument based on the substantive due process rights of
the juveniles' parents. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540 (discussing possibility of parental fundamental rights). There is no corresponding discussion in the Waters opinion. See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1132 (declining to address possible
implication of fundamental rights for parents). Thus, this Comment focuses on
the fundamental rights of juveniles, not their parents.
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mount to an application of the Fifth Amendment because if the rights of
juveniles are deemed to be fundamental, then ajuvenile curfew that limits
these rights must survive the highest level of constitutional scrutiny under
both substantive due process and equal protection applications.53 Conversely, if the rights are not considered fundamental, a lesser level of con54
stitutional scrutiny is applied.
Along these lines, the Waters court found that the curfew improperly
infringed upon the equal protection and substantive due process rights of
the juveniles. 55 The court specifically found that the juveniles did have a
fundamental right to move freely. 56 As a result, the curfew was subject to,
and failed under, an application of the strict scrutiny standard. 57 In light
of the results of this test, the court concluded that the curfew drew an
58
unconstitutional distinction between juveniles and non-juveniles.
Conversely, the Hutchins court was unsympathetic to the possibility of
a fundamental right for juveniles to move freely during the curfew
hours. 59 The court determined that there was no fundamental right for
juveniles to be in public places during curfew hours without parental supervision. 60 As a basis for its conclusion, the court cited the absence of
precedent or historical support for such a fundamental right.6 1 This resulted in an application of intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, which, in part, allowed the curfew to be upheld under the Fifth
Amendment. 62 Interestingly, in an attempt to cover all its bases, the
Hutchins court noted that even if the Curfew Act did implicate a fundamental right ofjuveniles, the curfew would have survived the strict scrutiny
standard. 63 As with the First Amendment issue, the Hutchins court's con53. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (recognizing that violation
of fundamental right implicates strict scrutiny); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that strict scrutiny is required when
challenged statute infringes on fundamental right).
54. See Cleburne Living Cent., 473 U.S. at 440 (finding that violation of right
that is not fundamental results in application of lesser standard than strict
scrutiny).
55. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1138 (finding violation of equal protection
clause).
56. See id. at 1139 (noting fundamental right ofjuveniles).
57. See id. (concluding that Emergency Act was not narrowly tailored and that
it fails to satisfy strict scrutiny standard).
58. See id. at 1138-39 (finding violation of Equal Protection Clause).
59. See Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("We
think that juveniles do not have a fundamental right to be on the streets at night
without adult supervision.").
60. See id. (noting that juveniles do not have right to come and go as they
wish).
61. See id. at 539 (noting lack of historical and precedential support).
62. See id. at 541-48 (determining that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate
constitutional standard, and upholding Curfew Act despite Fifth Amendment).
63. See id. at 541 (positing that curfew would survive heightened scrutiny).
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clusion on the Fifth Amendment issue stands in contrast to the stance
adopted by the Waters court.64
In sum, Hutchins and Waters deal with two curfews enacted to resolve
similar problems in the same city. 65 Yet, the respective courts treated
these curfews very differently, to the point of disagreeing on the very nature of the First and Fifth Amendments. 66 It seems only logical then that
one of the two decisions is more constitutionally sound than the other on
each of the two issues. Unfortunately, it is not quite that simple. As the
following analysis will make clear, both courts came to reasonable conclusions in determining whether there was an infringement of the juveniles'
First Amendment freedoms. 67 Both approaches, however, contain substantial drawbacks. 68 With respect to the Fifth Amendment challenges,
the decisions are in complete opposition, and therefore, one of the opinions is superior. 69 This Comment demonstrates that the Waters decision
70
takes the more constitutionally consistent Fifth Amendment approach.

III.

ANALYsis:

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Juvenile rights under the Constitution are not always coextensive with
adult rights. 7 1 It is apparent, however, that juvenile curfews may infringe
on juveniles' First Amendment rights. 72 Less clear is exactly how curfews
64. CompareWaters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134-37 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that juveniles have same fundamental right to free movement as adults, and
applying strict scrutiny), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539-45 (recognizing that
juveniles do not have same fundamental right to free movement as adults, and
applying intermediate scrutiny).
65. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534 (noting that District of Columbia Council
enacted Curfew Act after determining that crime and victimization in District was
becoming more common); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1127 (making clear that District
of Columbia Council adopted Emergency Act in response to violence and drug
trafficking).
66. For a discussion of differing approaches of Waters and Hutchins see supra
notes 43-65 and accompanying text and infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of First Amendment positions of Waters and Hutchins, see
supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion of drawbacks of First Amendment positions, see infra
notes 87-135 and accompanying text.
69. For a discussion and comparison of Fifth Amendment positions, see infra
notes 160-84 and accompanying text.
70. For a discussion of the superior fundamental rights analysis in Waters, see
infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (distinguishing between constitutional rights of minors and adults); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) (same); Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (same); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (same).
72. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 616-19 (1984) (determining that freedom of association is incidental to First Amendment freedoms).
Logically, a restriction that limits the ability to associate with others has the potential to infringe upon First Amendment rights. See id; see also W.J.W. v. State, 356 So.
2d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (determining that juvenile curfew that
"[r]estrain[ed] children . . . from freely walking upon the streets or other public
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may infringe upon these rights. 73 While there have consistently been con-

stitutional challenges to juvenile curfews under the First Amendment,
these challenges have not been uniform in nature.7 4 In fact, there are two
different forms of First Amendment challenges to juvenile curfews. 75 A
number of courts have determined that juvenile curfews restrain express
76
First Amendment freedoms such as the rights of assembly and religion.
Other courts, including the Waters court, have concluded 77that the right to
free movement is, in itself, a First Amendment freedom.
The stronger approach is to argue that curfews restrain First Amendment freedoms. 78 Courts applying this view focus on how curfews infringe
upon juveniles' freedoms of speech, expression, association and religion. 79 An excellent example of this approach can be found in Nunez v.
City of San Diego.8 ° In Nunez, the plaintiffs argued that the curfew was
overly broad on its face in that it unreasonably restricted minors' legiti81
The Ninth Circuit
mate exercise of their First Amendment rights.

agreed, stating that the juvenile curfew at issue "had an integral effect on
places when no emergency exist[ed] . .. [was] incompatible with the freedoms of

speech, association, peaceful assembly and religion" and was therefore deemed
unconstitutional).
73. For a discussion of the effects of differing First Amendment approaches,
see infra notes 74-135 and accompanying text.
74. CompareJohnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. Unit
A Oct. 1981) (inquiring whether curfew affects long-established First Amendment
rights), with Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (inquiring

whether freedom of movement is rooted in expression of association rights).
75. Compare Opelousas, 658 F.2d at 1072 (finding that curfews directly affect
First Amendment rights), with Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (noting that freedom is
rooted in expression of association rights). See Martin E. Mooney, Note, Assessing
the ConstitutionalValidity ofJuvenile Curfew Statutes, 52 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 858, 861
(1977) (identifying two approaches to judging constitutionality ofjuvenile curfews
under First Amendment).
76. See Opelousas, 658 F.2d at 1072 (finding indirect right due to infringement
on express rights).
77. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (finding direct right to movement).
78. For a discussion explaining why the former approach is stronger, see infra
notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
79. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14
(1969) (noting minors' right to free expression); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (describing freedom of movement as "kin to the right of
assembly and to the right of association"); W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (finding minors have freedom of religion and expression).
80. 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
81. See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 940 (noting challenge based on overly broad application and finding curfew unconstitutional). A statute is overly broad when it
"make[s] unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct
.... " City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987); see also Thornhill v. Ala.,
310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (finding that law will be void when it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control but ... sweeps
within its ambit other activities" protected by the First Amendment).
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the ability of minors to express themselves."8 2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
83
determined that the curfew was unconstitutional.
The second type of challenge is different in that it attempts to establish that juvenile curfews directly trample on an actual freedom of movement found in the First Amendment.8 4 The foremost opinion advocating
this view comes from Waters, where the court found that the right to meet
publicly for no particular purpose was rooted in the Constitution.8 5 In
part for this reason, the court found the Emergency Act to be overly broad
and unconstitutional.8 6 The Waters opinion is an excellent example of a
court coming to the correct conclusion for the wrong reason. While the
Emergency Act did infringe on the juveniles' First Amendment freedoms,
87
there is no freedom of movement inherent in the First Amendment.
This limitation is apparent in the Supreme Court's approach, which
does not include free mobility in the First Amendment as a full-fledged
First Amendment right.8 8 In analyzing the scope of First Amendment
rights, the Court has determined that the "Constitution [does not] recognize a generalized right of 'social association' that includes chance encounters in dance halls."8 9 Furthermore, the Court has found that
freedom of association is limited, stating that "[i] t is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for example, walking down the street, or meeting one's friends at a shopping
mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the
protection of the First Amendment." 90
82. Nunez, 114 F.3d at 950-51. The Fifth Circuit also adopted the first view.
SeeJohnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981)
(finding that minors' First Amendment rights were burdened by curfew). The Opelousas court found minors' First Amendment rights burdened because the curfew
prohibited minors from attending associational gatherings such as religious or
school meetings, organized dances and theater and sporting events when reasonable and direct travel to or from such activities had to be made during the curfew
period. See id. (determining how First Amendment freedoms were burdened).
The curfew infringed on the freedoms of expression, association and religion and,
as a result, it was deemed unconstitutional. See id.
83. See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 952 (reversing decision of lower court).
84. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting constitutional right to meet publicly); see also Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.
Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating
that "[t]he rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where one pleases,
and to use the public streets in way that does not interfere with the personal liberty
of others are basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'. ...).
85. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (recognizing associational right).
86. See id. (stating that "the [Emergency] Act involves such a wide and indiscriminate denial of the First and Fifth Amendment rights of juveniles that it cannot be constitutionally applied").
87. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989) (declining to recognize specific First Amendment right to social association).
88. See id. (same).
89. Id. at 25.
90. Id. Lower courts have followed suit in refusing to extend First Amendment protection to all associational activities. See Bush v. Dassel-Cokato Bd. of
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Given the Supreme Court's stance, it seems unlikely that the Court
would extend First Amendment protection to activities such as sitting
outside on a muggy summer night or stargazing. 9 1 Nevertheless, the Waters court was most likely correct in finding that the Emergency Act violated the First Amendment. 92 The basis for its decision, however, is flawed
93
because there is no specific First Amendment right to free movement.
Interestingly, the conclusions about First Amendment freedoms reached
by the Hutchins court are not constitutionally sound either, even though
94
they stand in stark contrast to those made by the Waters court.
The District of Columbia City Council attempted to reconcile the
Curfew Act with the First Amendment by including specific exceptions,
designed to exempt legitimately protected activities from the general restrictions of the Act. 95 Again, note that the Emergency Act had included a
number of exceptions, but failed to provide the same exceptions as the
Curfew Act, most notably a general First Amendment exception. 96 These

rather limited exceptions did not save the Emergency Act from being
deemed unconstitutional. 9 7 Learning from its mistake, the District of Columbia Council went further in carving out exceptions to the Curfew
Act. 98 This, in turn, created an issue as to whether these new, more specific exceptions succeeded in protecting juveniles' First Amendment free-

Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562, 569 (D. Minn. 1990) (deciding that student's desire to
associate socially with her friends at parties was not either form of intimate or
expressive conduct entitled to protection under First Amendment).
91. See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25 (finding First Amendment protects right of
association in only limited circumstances).
92. SeeJill A. Lichtenbaum, Juvenile Curfews: Protectionor Regulation?, 14 N.Y.L.
SCH.J. HuM. RTs. 677, 691 (1998) (finding that if curfew ordinances fail to provide
adequate exceptions for First Amendment, they should be deemed
unconstitutional).
93. See id. at 684 (listing fundamental rights guaranteed by Constitution, not
including general freedom of mobility).
94. Compare Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that
"the curfew regulates the activit[ies] of juveniles during nighttime hours; it does
not, by its terms, regulate expressive conduct"), with Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp.
1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) ("[Ilt is apparent that the [Emergency] Act involves
such a wide and indiscriminate denial of the First Amendment . . . rights of
juveniles .... "). For a discussion of the differences between "exceptions" and
"defenses," see Tona Trollinger, TheJuvenile Curfew: UnconstitutionalImprisonment, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 949, 967 n.102 (1996).
95. For a list of exceptions to the Curfew Act, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
96. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1135-36 (explaining exceptions).

97. See id. at 1128 ("[Tihe Court is constrained to conclude that the [Emergency] Act is constitutionally unacceptable.").
98. Compare id. at 1135 (listing five exceptions), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535
(listing eight exceptions).
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doms, where the Emergency Act exceptions had failed. 99 It seems clear
that the exceptions sufficiently protect First Amendment freedoms. 100
The District of Columbia Council is not the first municipal body to
attempt this type of constitutional preservation through the use of specific
exceptions.1 0 ' Other municipalities have both succeeded and failed in using extensive exceptions to preserve the constitutionality of their curfews. 10 2 Many of the exceptions have been aimed at certain school,
church, political or social activities. 10 3
For example, one constitutional curfew contained exceptions based
on both the reasonable necessity communicated to the police by the minor's parent and for minors returning directly home from either a school
activity or activity of a religious or other voluntary association, when the
police were provided with written notice of the travel. 10 4 The ordinance
also contained a broad exception for the exercise of First Amendment
rights, including the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and the
right of assembly. 10 5 Further exceptions excluded minors that were employed, accompanied by an adult, authorized by a parent, traveling interstate, or minors on the sidewalk of their residence or the residence of
their next-door neighbors. 10 6 These exceptions went far enough in pro99. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1135 (offering five exceptions without First
Amendment exception), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535 (establishing eight exceptions including one aimed specifically at First Amendment freedoms).
100. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535 (specifically excepting First Amendment
rights, including free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and right of
assembly).
101. See Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (excepting minors participating in "reasonably necessary" travel, minors returning directly home from
school activities, minors returning from religious or voluntary association activities
and minors exercising First Amendment rights); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514
F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (D.N.H. 1981) (excepting minors' travel to and from place of
employment, from restaurant, library, movie theater, store, play, dance, sporting
event, church, meeting hall, school, courthouse or other place of public assembly);
City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Iowa 1989) (excepting minors'
presence on streets after curfew hours if they are traveling between home and
employment, church, municipal or school function or if they are accompanied by
their parent).
102. Compare Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266 (upholding curfew, in part, due to
exceptions), with McCollester, 514 F. Supp. at 1053 (striking down curfew despite
exceptions).
103. See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 852 (4th Cir. 1998)
(excepting attendance at supervised school and religiously sponsored events); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1997) (excepting travel to and
from school sponsored events); McCollester, 514 F. Supp. at 1048 (excepting travel
to schools and churches); Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1246-47 (same).
104. See Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266 (finding curfew constitutional based, in
part, because of exceptions).
105. See id. at 1269-71 (noting exceptions based specifically on First Amendment freedoms).
106. See id. (listing other exceptions).
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tecting juveniles' First Amendment freedoms, and, as a result, the curfew
10 7
was upheld.
One curfew that did not survive a constitutional challenge exempting
juveniles when they were passengers in a moving vehicle or if they were
traveling before midnight to or from a public assembly, "including participation in demonstrations, protests, gatherings, rallies, picketing, sit-ins,
sleep-ins, or similar occupations by a group seeking to publicize its position," provided that the city had granted a permit for such activity.10 8 This

particular court determined that the curfew impermissibly prohibited
many innocent behaviors despite the protection afforded by its exceptions. 10 9 Other curfews have used exceptions based on reasonable necessity or legitimate use. 110 One court determined that such a curfew, which
provided an exception for juveniles "upon an emergency errand or upon
legitimate business," was unconstitutional because it unnecessarily re11
stricted juveniles' personal freedoms. '
In light of these decisions, it is apparent that the exceptions set out in
the Curfew Act, and endorsed as constitutional in Hutchins, are similar to
the exceptions in previous constitutional curfews.11 2 In order to assure
constitutionality, however, the Curfew Act, like some other constitutional
curfews, adopted an exception that quite possibly sacrificed its own
113
effectiveness.
The first specific Curfew Act exception exempts a juvenile from restriction when the minor is running an errand, without detour, on behalf
of the minor's parent, guardian or caretaker.' 14 Similar provisions can be
found in the curfews at issue in both Qutb v. Strauss1 15 and Bykovsky v.

Middletown"16 -two examples of courts upholding curfews under First
Amendment attack. 117 Other Curfew Act exceptions exempt minors who
are: accompanied by a parent; commuting to or from a place of employment; traveling in a vehicle involved in interstate travel; remaining on the
107. See id. at 1266 (upholding curfew despite First Amendment challenge).
108. See McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1053 (finding ordinance unconstitutional
despite exceptions).
109. See id. at 1052 (discussing conduct of minors that is innocent in nature).
110. See Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1247 (excepting minors participating in "reasonably necessary" travel); see also Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 482
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (excepting travel based on legitimate business).
111. Allen, 524 A.2d at 482.
112. See Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266 (upholding curfew containing exceptions similar to those in Curfew Act); see also Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th
Cir. 1993) (same).
113. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d. 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(adding vague First Amendment exception).
114. See id. (noting errand exception).
115. 11 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1993).
116. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
117. See Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1247 (exempting reasonably necessary
travel); see also Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496 ("The parent may still allow the child to ...
perform an errand for the parent .... ).
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sidewalk bordering the minor's or the next-door neighbor's residence;
participating in an emergency; or attending an official school, religious or
other recreational activity sponsored by the District of Columbia, a civic
organization or another similar entity.1 1 8 These exceptions alone bring
the Curfew Act close in nature to other curfews held constitutional, but it
is the Curfew Act's eighth and final exception that brings the curfew fully
within the scope of other curfews deemed constitutional under the First
Amendment. l" 9 Pointed directly at First Amendment freedoms, the exception assures constitutionality, but it may also hinder any substantial practical effect of the curfew.

120

The First Amendment exception exempts juveniles from the restrictions of the Curfew Act when they are "exercising First Amendment rights,
including free exercise Of religion, freedom of speech, and the right to
assembly."1 21 The Hutchins court dismissed the juveniles' challenge to the
Curfew Act based on the vagueness of this exception. 12 2 In fact, the court
relied on the vagueness of the exception, stating that the lack of specificity
118. See McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (D.N.H. 1981)
(excepting minors' travel to and from place of employment, restaurant, library,
movie theater, store, play, dance, sporting event, church, meeting hall, school,
courthouse or other place of public accommodation, entertainment or assembly);
Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1247-48 (excepting minors returning directly home from
school activities, minors returning from religious or voluntary association activities
and minors exercising First Amendment rights); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445
N.W.2d 363; 364 (Iowa 1989) (excepting minors' presence on streets after curfew
hours if they are traveling between home and employment, church, municipal or
school function or if they are accompanied by their parents).
119. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 490 (upholding curfew based on specific exceptions
including First Amendment exception); see also Bykovsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266
(same).
The curfew in Quib excepted juveniles: (1) accompanied by a parent or guardian; (2) running an errand without detour for a parent or guardian; (3) riding in a
motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) engaging in an employment activity,
or going to or returning home from an employment activity, without any detour or
stop; (5) involved in an emergency situation; (6) staying on the sidewalk abutting
the minor's residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the
neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor's presence;
(7) attending an official school, religious or other recreational activity supervised
by adults and sponsored by the City of Dallas, a civic organization, or another
similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home
from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious or other recreational
activity supervised by adults an sponsored by the City of Dallas, a civic organization,
or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) exercising First
Amendment rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, such as the free exercise of
religion, freedom of speech and the right of assembly; or (9) married or formerly
married. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 498.
120. See Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d. 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (approving
broad exception that allows minors to exercise First Amendment rights without
violating Curfew Act).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 546-48 (finding statutory provision sufficiently definite).
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allowed the Curfew Act to avoid undercutting parental control. 123 With
this finding, the court placed itself in a precarious position. By embracing
the vagueness and potentially broad scope of the First Amendment exception, the court was able to reconcile the Curfew Act with the First Amendment. It seems, however, that there was a price to pay for this
24
reconciliation. 1
This vague exception of the Curfew Act serves to delay litigation, because it is not clear what specific juvenile actions are included within the
Curfew Act's "First Amendment rights."1 25 The Hutchins court provided
minimal guidance by limiting "expressive conduct" to those actions intended to convey a particular message.' 26 This slight narrowing of the
exception, however, provides only a modicum of guidance because there
are many actions that could reasonably fall within or outside this exception. 127 The Hutchins court itself admitted that there are actions that must
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis because they are not clearly within the
scope of the curfew.' 28 There is simply no way to tell, and the resulting
129
ambiguity and lack of notice only succeeds in creating future litigation.
Furthermore, if too many actions fall within the scope of the exception, then the exception may have the effect of swallowing the rule. In
light of the probable effects of this exception, the District of Columbia
Council assured constitutionality under the First Amendment in exchange
for future confusion over the scope of the curfew.' 30 Such future confu123. See id. at 546 (stating that "the very flexibility that the administration of
the curfew contemplates enhances parental control").
124. See id. (holding that exception ensures that curfew will not infringe upon
First Amendment rights).
125. See id. (failing to set out specific juvenile actions that constitute "First
Amendment rights").
126. See id. ("[T]he defense simply assures that the curfew will not be applied
to protected expression . .

").

127. See id. (noting that some situations will require case-by-case treatment).
128. See id. (stating that "there may be marginal cases [in] between ...[that]
can be addressed as they arise . ...).
129. See id. (implying that those actions, not clearly within exceptions, will
probably be addressed in future case-by-case litigation).

130. See id. (upholding broad exception protecting indeterminate pool of activities). Despite the problems inherit with broad exceptions, a curfew not containing such protection may be less likely to survive. SeeJohnson v. City of Opelousas,
658 F.2d 1065, 1073-74 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (determining that curfew was
unconstitutional because it restricted innocent First Amendment activities); City of
Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 182-86 (Iowa 1992) (same); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1987) (same); see also
Craig M. Johnson, It's Ten O'Clock: Do You Know Where Your Children Are? Qutb v.
Strauss and the Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfews, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 327, 363
n.62 (1994) ("The failure to draft the curfew with an exception for First Amendment activities should result in an unconstitutional curfew."); Lichtenbaum, supra
note 92, at 691 ("When curfew ordinances fail to provide adequate exceptions,
they infringe upon the First Amendment rights that minors possess."); Jeremy
Toth, Note,Juvenile Curfew: Legal Perspectives and Beyond, 14 IN PUB. INTEREST 39, 62
(1994-95) ("A properly constructed curfew contains exceptions for registered First
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sion could have signaled the Hutchins court to strike down the Curfew Act
based on the unconstitutional vagueness of the First Amendment
13 1
exception.
In sum, both the Waters and Hutchins courts arrived at arguably correct, but flawed conclusions in deciding whether their respective curfews
infringed on the First Amendment rights ofjuveniles.132 The Waters court
reasonably found the Emergency Act unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, however, it based its analysis on a direct First Amendment
right to free movement, a freedom that never existed and a concept which
has since been expressly dismissed.1 33 The Hutchins court, on the other
hand, reasonably found the Curfew Act constitutional, but relied in large
part on the strength of a vague First Amendment exception. At best, this
13 4
exception hinders enforcement, and at worst, proves unconstitutional.
Thus, neither court came to a completely sound constitutional conclusion,
and, as a result, neither opinion exhibits a superior First Amendment
analysis.135
IV.

ANALYsis:

THE FirH AMENDMENT

Freedom of expression issues are not the sole sources of inconsistency
between the Waters and Hutchins decisions. 136 Far more contradictory are
the respective courts' positions concerning the constitutionality ofjuvenile
13 7
curfews under substantive due process and the Equal Protection Clause.
Amendment activities as well as instances where the adolescent is accompanied by
an adult."). But see, City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Wis. 1988)

(determining that curfew lacking First Amendment exception was not overly
broad).
131. See Allen, 524 A.2d at 478 (holding that express exception was unconstitutionally vague); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. •352, 357 (1983) ("[T]he voidfor-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense

with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."); S.W. v. State, 431 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that curfew ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it lacked sufficient
guidelines and provided potential for selective enforcement).
132. For a discussion of the unsound conclusions, see supra notes 79-131 and

accompanying text.
133. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (stating that
right to free movement is "rooted in the First Amendment's protection of expression and association").
134. See Allen, 524 A.2d at 480-82 (finding broad express exception was unconstitutionally vague).
135. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d: at 547-48 (failing to recognize vagueness of First
Amendment exception); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134 (advocating nonexistent First
Amendment right to freedom of movement).
136. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134-37 (finding that Emergency Act violates Fifth Amendment), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-44 (determining that Cur-

few Act does not violate Fifth Amendment).
137. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134-37 (holding thatjuveniles have same
fundamental right to free movement as adults, applying strict scrutiny and striking
down curfew), with Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-44 (recognizing that juveniles do not
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The Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike 13 8 In order for a curfew or any other law to survive
an equal protection or substantive due process challenge, it must be either
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose or substantially related to
an important governmental interest.' 3 9 A law that infringes upon a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class obviously will fail under rational
basis scrutiny. 140 If a law is based on a suspect classification, such as race,
alienage, illegitimacy or gender, or if the law infringes upon a fundamental right under either substantive due process or equal protection analysis,
the higher constitutional standard of strict scrutiny will apply.14 1 When
strict scrutiny is applied, a law will be deemed constitutional only if it is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.142 Thus, the determination of whether a law, such as a juvenile curfew, burdens a suspect
class or restricts a fundamental right is paramount to its survival under an
143
equal protection or substantive due process challenge.
In deciding which standard to apply to juvenile curfews, it is important to note that age does not create a suspect classification.1 44 Therefore,
the central issue in juvenile curfew cases revolves around the possible exishave same fundamental right to free movement as adults, applying intermediate
scrutiny and upholding curfew).
138. See City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (noting basic goal of Equal Protection Clause).
139. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)
(finding that in order to uphold state curfew ordinance, state must show curfew is
rationally related to legitimate state interest).
140. See id. (pointing out exceptions to usual rational basis standard).
141. See id. (noting that there is higher standard when ordinance affects suspect class or potentially infringes upon fundamental right); see also Hill v. Stone,
421 U.S. 289, 295 (1975) (affecting right to vote); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 355-56 (1972) (same); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971)
(affecting suspect class); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (affecting right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 675-78 (1969) (affecting
suspect class); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)

(same).
142. See Gaffney v. City of Allentown, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14565, at *18
(E.D. Pa. 1997) ("For the curfew to survive strict scrutiny, the City must show a
compelling state interest and the curfew must be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.").
143. Compare id. at *18-30 (applying strict scrutiny and striking down curfew),
with Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 855 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding curfew after applying intermediate scrutiny), and Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.
1976) (upholding curfew under rational basis standard).
144. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (finding that age does
not constitute suspect class); see also Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 31314 (1976) (noting that age does not constitute suspect class); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (finding that "suspect class" is class of persons "saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such history of purposeful unequal treatment, or regulated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritorian political process"); Qutb v. Strauss,
11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that age does not constitute suspect class).
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tence of ajuvenile fundamental right to free movement and whether juvenile curfews infringe upon that right. 145 Both the Waters and Hutchins
courts dealt with this issue differently. The Waters court acknowledged a
fundamental right for juveniles, while the Hutchins court declined to rec46
ognize any such right.1
Adults generally have a fundamental right to move freely and travel at
all times. 14 7 This, however, does not necessarily mean that juveniles have
the same right. 148 The question of whether adults and juveniles have the
145. SeeJohnson, supra note 130, at 345-46 ("The issue is significant because a
conclusion that a minor does not have a fundamental right to movement results in
an Equal Protection analysis using the less stringent rational basis test.").
146. Compare Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125,1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding
that right to walk streets "is rooted in the First Amendment's protection of expression and association, as well as ...the Fifth Amendment's protection of fundamental liberty interests under the doctrine of substantive due process"), with Hutchins
v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("We think thatjuveniles do not have a
fundamental right to be on the streets at night without adult supervision.").
147. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) ("Freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution." (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)));
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (determining that
Constitution protects right to wander, stroll or loaf because "[t]hese unwritten
amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity"); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (upholding fundamental right to interstate travel because "the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel .

.

."); Aptheker v.

Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964) (finding law that restricted passport application unconstitutional because it restricted Fifth Amendment right to travel);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ("The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment ....

Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of

values.").
General curfews have been upheld in emergency situations. See Ervin v. State,
163 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Wis. 1968) (finding curfew during riots restricted right to
movement); Glover v. D.C., 250 A.2d 556, 561 (D.C. App. Ct. 1969) (finding that
right to travel was not protected during riots when streets neared state of anarchy).
148. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944) (noting that in
some instances state power to restrict children's activities is broader than power to
restrict adult's activities); Bykovsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242,
1265 (M.D. Pa 1975), affd per curiam; 535 F.2d. 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that
minors do not have same constitutional rights as adults); People ex reL J.M., 768
P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) (holding that minor's right to intra-city travel was not
fundamental); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 386 (Iowa 1989)
(same); Metro. Dade County v. Pred, 665 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(determining thatjuveniles do not always possess same level of rights under Constitution as adults); Katherine H. Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1315, 1332 (1995) ("[C]hildren stand in a different relation to the
Constitution."); see also Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (holding that right to movement extended to minors for purpose of overbreadth analysis); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134
(holding that right to walk streets is protected under First and Fifth Amendments);
McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384-85 (D.N.H. 1984) (holding
that curfew violated juvenile's freedom of movement); McCollester v. City of
Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D.N.H. 1981) (determining that right to move-
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same fundamental right to free movement has created much confusion, in
large part, because, as Justice Marshall once stated, "[t] he prior decisions
of this Court provide no clear answer" to the question. 149 Justice Marshall's assessment is still true at the present time, as there remains no di50
rect determination of the scope of juveniles' free movement rights.'
The Court, however, has created a framework that many courts and commentators believe judges should use to determine whether a right that is
151
fundamental for adults should be fundamental for juveniles as well.
ment is invaluable to juveniles), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982);
City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa 1992) ("Whenever the
First Amendment rights . . .require one to move about, such movement must
necessarily be protected under the First Amendment."); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (determining that curfew
unconstitutionally restricted right to free movement); City of Milwaukee v. KF.,
426 N.W.2d 329, 337 (Wis. 1988) (holding that juvenile curfew infringed upon
minors' right to free movement); Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 606 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992) (holding that minors' right to movement is widely recognized as
fundamental); Paul M. Cahill, Note, Nonemergency Municipal Curfew Ordinances and
the Liberty Interests of Minors, 12 FoRDHwM UB.LJ. 513, 558-59 (1984) (positing that
juvenile curfews are unconstitutional unless limited to loitering or prowling, except in case of emergency condition); Jonathan Hangartner, Comment, The Constitutionality of Large Scale Police Tactics: Implicationsfor the Right of Intrastate Travel, 14
PAc E L. REv. 203, 232 (1994) (finding that police sweeps are de facto curfews in
violation ofjuveniles' constitutional rights); Note, Assessing the Scope of Minor's Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution,supra note 2, at 1174-77 (arguing that juvenile curfews do not serve sufficient state purpose to justify limiting
minors' fundamental right to free movement).
149. Bykovsky, 429 U.S. at 965 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. SeeRamos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184 (D. Conn. 1999)
("The Supreme Court has never clearly indicated the appropriate level of scrutiny
to apply to legislation that affects minors."); see also Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for
ConstitutionalStandards:Judicial Review ofJuvenile Curfew Ordinances, 24 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 381, 383 (1991) ("Circumstances have not changed since Justice
Marshall's complaint that past Supreme Court cases do not provide a reliable
guide for reviewing courts to appropriately weigh and evaluate minors' rights as
opposed to like rights of adults."); Chen, supra note 2, at 132 ("The confusion in
youth curfew jurisprudence arises from the absence of a unified legal framework
that would enable courts to analyze the relevant relationships among state, parent,
and child."); Charles W. Gerdes, Note, Juvenile Curfew Challenges in the Federal
Courts: A ConstitutionalConundrum Over the (Less Than) FundamentalRights of Minors,
11 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 395, 398 (1999) (recognizing that there is no bright line

rule from Supreme Court defining analytical framework for determination of coextensive fundamental rights for minors). The Supreme Court has denied certiorari to cases challenging the constitutionality of juvenile curfews on a number of
occasions. See, e.g., Qutb v. Bartlett, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994) (denying petition for
writ of certiorari).
151. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979) (establishing three-part
test). Bellotti dealt with the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that required parental consent before a minor could have a lawful abortion. See id. at
625-26 (citing MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979)). The statute provided that in order for an unmarried woman less than eighteen years old to
obtain an abortion, the women needed the consent of both parents. In the absence of such consent, ajudge could issue an order permitting the abortion upon
a showing of good cause. See id. The court determined that the statute was uncon-
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In dealing with juvenile abortion, the United States Supreme Court,
in Bellotti v. Baird,152 established three factors to justify treating juveniles
and adults differently. 153 The three factors the Court set out were: (1)a
peculiar vulnerability of juveniles; (2) an inability for juveniles to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and (3) the importance of the parental role in child rearing. 154 Following the Bellotti decision, many courts, including the Waters court, applied the Bellotti factors to
155
define the scope of juvenile rights in other non-abortion contexts.
Nevertheless, what at first glance appeared to be an applicable standard has become a hotly debated issue. 156 The crux of this debate centers
over whether the Bellotti factors should apply outside the abortion context
in which they were first created. 157 Those courts and commentators that
would limit the factors to the facts of Bellotti point to the unusual issues
that arise with juvenile abortions and parental consent. 158 Specifically,
those that oppose the application in the realm ofjuvenile curfews point to
the Court's own words: "The abortion decision differs in important ways
from other decisions that may be made during minority .... [T] here are
few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important
decision will have consequences so grave and indelible." 159 Finally, these
courts and commentators stress that only four of the eight justices joined
160
the opinion establishing the three factors.

In contrast, other courts have applied the Bellotti factors to non-abor161
tion contexts based upon the specific language of the Bellotti decision.
stitutional because it unduly infringed on the minor's right to seek the procedure.
See id.
152. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
153. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-39 (establishing three factors used to indicate
whether adult and juvenile rights are coextensive).
154. See id. at 633 (listing three factors).

155. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 368-69 (Iowa 1989) (us-

ing Bellotti factors to determine scope ofjuveniles rights); see also City of Milwaukee
v. KF., 426 N.W.2d 329, 339-40 (Wis. 1988) (applying Bellotti factors to determine
whether minors' rights deserved less deference).
156. See Beaumont, supra note 2, at 103 ("[S]ubsequent courts have applied
Bellotti inconsistently when assessing the constitutionality of facially similar juvenile
curfews.").
157. Compare id. at 101-02 (recognizing that Bellotti factors may apply outside
abortion context, but Supreme Court has never expressed willingness to extend
factors), with Vill. of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(finding application of Bellotti factors was "troublesome outside of the particular
setting of abortion rights"), and Horowitz, supra note 150, at 383-84 (rejecting ap-

plication of Bellotti factors in juvenile curfew context).

. 158. See Beaumont, supra note 2, at 102 (acknowledging important differ-

ences involved in making abortion decision from other decisions faced by minors).
159. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
160. See id. at 622-23 (discussing endorsement of Bellotti factor approach by
four justices).
161. See Privor, supra note 1, at 429 (noting that courts have most often applied Bellotti factors when dealing with rights of minors).
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Those courts supporting the application of the Bellotti factors in non-abortion contexts cite the Bellotti court's recognition of the special constitutional position of minors when it remarked that "the status of minors
under the law is unique in many respects."1 62 This statement by the Bellotti
court recognizing a difference of rights seems to indicate that the Court
intended a more general application of its approach.' 63 Moreover, the
decision takes into account the "many ways" in which juvenile rights may
differ from the rights of adults. 164 Furthermore, the Bellotti court never
1 65
expressly limited the factors to the abortion context.
Besides the specific language of the decision, the Court, in forming
the Bellotti factors, relied on prior decisions distinguishing between juvenile and adult rights outside the abortion context. 166 Surely, the factors
still apply in the contexts from which they were derived; therefore, the
logical extension of this reality is that the Bellotti factors already apply and
should continue to apply in other areas beyond juvenile abortion
1 67
rights.
Nevertheless, because the Court has never established an applicable
standard, one cannot be absolutely certain that the Court will apply the
Bellotti factors to juvenile curfews. 168 Given the broad language and foundations of the Bellotti decision, coupled with the lack of any other discernable standard, it is likely that the Court will use the Bellotti factors if and
162. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.

163. See id. at 634 (discussing need for flexible application of constitutional
principles to situations involving minors and recognizing "that the constitutional

rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults").
164. See id. at 633-34 (finding unique role of family requires constitutional
principles be applied more flexibly).
165. See id. (lacking express limitation on applicability of Bellotti factors).

166. See id. at 634-39 (relying on previous caselaw in creating Bellotti factors).
In forming the test, the Bellotti court relied on Ginsberg v. N.Y.,390 U.S. 629
(1968), and Prince v. Mass, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which illustrate the difficulties
juveniles have in making mature choices. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 636 (discussing
Court's concern over inability of children to make mature decisions). Furthermore, the Court relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Wis. v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which establish that the rights of parents should be
weighed in determining whether juveniles deserve the same rights as adults. See
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-39 (justifying limitations on freedom of minors).
167. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629 (forming basis for second Bellotti factor); Prince, 321 U.S. at 158 (same); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (same); Pierce, 268 U.S. at
510 (forming basis for third Bellotti factor).
168. See Peter L. Scherr, Note, TheJuvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New
Standardof Review, 41 WAsH. U.J. UiuB. & CoNTEMP. L. 163, 192 (1992) .(noting lack
of Supreme Court-advocated standard regarding fundamental rights of minors);
Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 1, at 290 ("The Supreme Court has refrained
from setting out a precise framework for analyzing the rights of juveniles differently from the rights of adults."); see also Horowitz, supra note 150, at 383 ("The
Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances, and there is no definite indication that it would rely upon the Bellotti analysis if it were to consider the issue.").
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when it examines ajuvenile curfew statute. 169 As a result, the three factors
170
constitute a "useful starting point for examining juvenile curfew laws."
The Waters court recognized this usefulness and applied the Bellotti
factors to the juvenile curfew context, deciding that "[a] n application of
these criteria ... makes clear that there is no basis for treating juveniles
differently than adults .... -171 Likewise, the Nunez court adopted the
Bellotti factors, finding that the "three specific [Bellotti] factors.., warrant
differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults," in
172
the context of juvenile curfews.
Despite these decisions, the D.C. Circuit in Hutchins declined to apply
the Bellotti factors in ajuvenile curfew context.1 73 Rather, the court simply
concluded that "it would be inconsistent to find a fundamental right"
when "the [Supreme] Court has concluded that the state may intrude
upon the 'freedom' of juveniles in a variety of similar circumstances without implicating fundamental rights." 174 As an explanation for its position,
the court first pointed to the Supreme Court's statements limiting juvenile
free movement in Schall v. Martin 75 and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.1 76 In alluding to these cases, however, the court confused parental
169. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[The Bellotti]
analysis affects the balancing.., of the state's interest against the interests of the
minor when determining whether the state's interest is compelling."); see also Gerdes, supra note 150, at 402 ("This statement by the Court [setting out the three
factors] explicitly directs the application of the three factors, and therefore the
inquiry of the decision-maker, to the differentiation of the constitutional rights of
minors from those of adults."); Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 1, at 292 ("The
Supreme Court most clearly illuminated its rationale for denying juveniles the protection of some fundamental rights while extending the protection of others as
enjoyed by adults in Bellotti.... ."). But see Horowitz, supra note 150, at 408 ("It is by
no means clear that the Supreme Court will apply the Bellotti factors in all future
cases involving children's rights.").
170. Privor, supra note 1, at 432; see Gerdes, supa note 150, at 406 (stating
usefulness of Bellotti decision in analyzing rights ofjuveniles). As one commentator stated:
The Supreme Court's discourse ...sheds a bright light on the constitutionally permissible ends that would justify state intrusion into the decision making process of minors but not of adults. It is in this light that the
criticality of any given choice facing a minor should be assessed in determining whether broader state power is justified under Bellotti.
Id.
171. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1989); see Privor,
supra note 1, at 429 (noting that "[i]n reviewing the constitutionality of juvenile
curfew ordinances, courts have most often turned to Bellotti v. Baird .... .").
172. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997).
173. See Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3D 531, 538-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (declining to
apply Bellotti factors).
174. Id. at 539.
175. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
176. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). In Vernonia, a high school student and his parents
challenged a regulation enacted by the school district requiring all participants in
interscholastic athletic events to submit to random urinalysis testing for illegal
drug use. See id. at 649-50 (noting facts). The Supreme Court determined that the
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custody with governmental custody, as both cases define the rights of
juveniles placed under government custody, not juveniles under parental
custody.

177

In support of the Curfew Act, the Hutchins court highlighted the treatment of deportable juveniles, juvenile delinquents, juveniles selling goods
on public streets and juveniles buying nearly obscene material. 178 While
these situations involve aspects of juvenile free movement, they all entail
179
some condition making them different from a plain juvenile curfew.
Unlike the restrictions relied on by the Hutchins court, the Curfew Act
reaches all juveniles.18 0 It is not limited to delinquency, the sale of goods,
81
deportation or obscenity. '
These limitations are significant. Because a minor does not have a
fundamental right to preach on public streets, it does not necessarily follow that the minor lacks the fundamental right to free movement after a
certain time of night.' 8 2 Thus, the Hutchins court ignored the certain
level of uncertainty associated with juvenile curfews.' 8 3 As previously
noted, the Bellotti factors provide a mechanism to deal with this type of
uncertainty.' 8 4 In turn, the Hutchins court should have applied the Bellotti
searches, when conducted in schools, were reasonable rather than finding that the
students were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 664-65 (discussing constitutionality of Vernonia School District's policy).
177. See generally, Schall, 467 U.S. 253 (focusing on juveniles under governmental custody); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. 646 (same); see also, e.g.,
Nunez, 114
F.3d at 945 ("[W]e reject the City's argument that Vernonia changes or abandons
the Bellotti framework."). It is important to note thatJustice Scalia emphasized the
limited scope of Vernonia by stating that "[c] entral ... to the present case is the fact
that the subjects of the [drug testing] Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been
committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster." Vernonia Sch.
Dist., 515 U.S. at 654.
178. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539 (setting out curfews aimed at specific
actions).
179. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (upholding regulation
limiting movement of deportable juveniles); Schal4 467 U.S. at 263-64 (upholding
pretrial detention of juvenile delinquents); Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 637-43
(1968) (banning sale of material to minors that would not be "obscene" to adults);
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944) (upholding state's ability to restrict juvenile street preaching).
180. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534 (establishing that Curfew Act applies to all
juveniles under age sixteen).
181. See id. at 534-35 (making clear that Curfew Act is not aimed at any particular juvenile activity).
182. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 169 (upholding state's ability to restrict juveniles
from preaching on streets, not from being on streets).
183. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538-41 (relying on highly distinguishable
caselaw rather than applying Bellotti factors).
184. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that Bellotti factors provide guidance in determining whether juveniles
have same rights as adults).
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than implying a
factors to the juveniles affected by the Curfew Act, rather
18 5
standard derived from very different circumstances.
Had the Hutchins court applied the Bellotti factors, it is likely that, as in
the Waters decision, there would have been no justification for creating a
different standard for juveniles.1 86 The Hutchins court would have had to
first determine whether a peculiar vulnerability existed for children.18 7 In
applying the first factor, it is apparent that the vulnerability is not limited
to children.18 8 As the court in Waters noted, "violence is ubiquitous" as all
189
citizens are vulnerable to crime at night.
Arguably, juveniles may be more vulnerable than adults to crime at
night because they are easier to physically or mentally overwhelm and, in
turn, are more likely targets of crime. 190 One obvious weakness of this
approach, however, is that juveniles are just as physically or mentally inferior during the daytime-a no less threatening time of the day.191 Also,
185. See Trollinger, supra note 94, at 990 (stating that courts should apply
Bellotti factors to assess government interest in regulating liberties of juveniles).
186. See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945 ("The Bellotti test does not establish a lower
level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile
curfew."); SeeWaters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1989) ("An application of these [Bellotti] criteria in this case makes clear that there is no basis for
treating juveniles differently than adults .... ).
187. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (noting that first indicator
is peculiar vulnerability of juveniles).
188. SeeJohnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. Unit A
Oct. 1981) (discussing absence of particular vulnerability associated with minors
engaging in nocturnal activities); see also Beaumont, supra note 2, at 102
("[N]octurnal crime does pose a danger to minors who are, in general, more vulnerable than adults. However, this ignores the fact that not only is violence ubiquiitous, victimizing all persons, but all persons-both minors and adults-are
vulnerable to nocturnal crime.").
189. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137; see also Privor, supra note 1, at 446 ("The
plague of violence does not uniquely affect juveniles .... "); Beaumont, supra note
2, at 84-85 ("[A] dults account for a significant amount of all violent crime arrests,
yet it is a small proportion of juvenile offenders that is driving rapid and sweeping
legislation aimed at curbing violent juvenile crime and victimization."); Horowitz,
supra note 150, at 410 ("[I]t is obvious that the plague afflicting the District [of
Columbia] poses no peculiar danger to children.").
In 1995, the year the Curfew Act was enacted, juveniles accounted for only
eighteen percent of all serious crime arrests, thus amounting to less than one-fifth
of all persons entering the criminal justice system charged with committing a violent crime. See HowARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 1995, 1-2 (1997) (summarizing statistics on arrests
ofjuveniles). Furthermore, less than one-half of one percent of persons ages ten
through seventeen were arrested for committing a violent crime. See id. (discussing findings of Uniform Crime Reporting Program).
190. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 372 (Iowa 1989)
(Lavorato, J., dissenting) ("Physically, children are generally smaller, weaker, and
less capable of taking care of themselves than adults."); see also Toth, supra note
130, at 56 ("The vulnerability of a child is not simply physical; there are emotional
and mental vulnerabilities as well.").
191. See Lester, supra note 1, at 867 n.181 ("[M]ore kids are killed or injured
by their parents, so if you really want to protect kids, you should pass a law, saying
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such logic would justify restrictions on the elderly or physically impaired.' 92 Thus, a juvenile curfew does not really protect minors from
19 3
their own natural limitations.
Moreover, even if minors are more vulnerable due to these limitations, one could argue that adults are more likely to be criminal targets
than juveniles because they usually carry greater wealth, such as money
and jewelry, when traveling. These theories are supported by statistical
data showing that, although persons younger than twenty-five may be the
most susceptible to crime, eighteen to twenty-one year olds are most likely
to fall victim to violent crime. 194 Thus, juveniles that participate in legitimate late night activities are no more at risk than adults in the same circumstances, albeit for different reasons.1 95 Therefore, like the Emergency
196
Act, the Curfew Act would not have satisfied the first Bellotti factor.
Similarly, the Curfew Act would not have satisfied the second Bellotti
factor, which requires a weighing of the juveniles' ability to make informed decisions. 197 Here, the Hutchins court would have to decide which
kids can't be home between 7:00 and midnight .... ") (citing 20/20. Time to Go
Home, at 12 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1994)); Fox Butterfield, Successes
Reported for Curfews, but Doubts Persist, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at Al (stating that

"most juvenile crime occurs after school, from 3 to 6 P.M., not late at night when

most curfews are in force"); see a/soJames Gill, ACLU's Drive to Scrap City's Curfew,

Sept. 16, 1994, at B7 (positing that keeping juveniles off streets
merely convinces public that fewer juveniles will become crime victims); Mark
Sauer, Effectiveness of Curfew Remains Questionable, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRIB., June 8,
1996, at El (finding that most violent crimes and victimization occurs during day-

TIMES-PICAYUNE,

time); Mark D. Shear, Prince William Supervisors Vote to Impose Curfew on Youths,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1997, at B3 (declaring that eighty percent of murders and
eighty-two percent of robberies resulting in charges against minors occurred
outside curfew hours);Jodi Wilgoren & Faye Fiore, Curfews Citedfor Drop in Juvenile
Crime Rate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al (attributing failure of city's juvenile
curfew to fact that crime occurs mainly during non-curfew hours).
192. See Panora,445 N.W.2d at 372 (Lavorato,J., dissenting) ("[I]f the government could merely use such vulnerabilities to justify juvenile curfews, the government could easily cite similar concerns to justify barring the elderly or physically
impaired from the streets. [It] could.., extend such reasoning to exclude women
or members of racial groups from certain areas of some cities . . ").
193. See id. ("Because physical vulnerability alone does not sufficiently distinguish children from adults, the government cannot use this as an excuse to justify
otherwise impermissible curfews aimed solely at children.").
194. See CRAIG A. PERKINS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, AGE PATTERNS OF VICTIMS OF
SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME

2 (1997) (establishing that persons age eighteen to twenty-

one are more likely to be victims of violent crime than juveniles); see also Gerdes,
supranote 150, at 441 (noting statistical data used by District of Columbia to justify
curfew indicated that minors under age seventeen were not particularly attracted
to criminal activity).
195. See Horowitz, supra note 150, at 410 (finding no particular threat of violence to juveniles); see also Privor, supra note 1, at 446 (same).
196. See Privor, supra note 1, at 446 ("The State's desire to protect children
from crime and violence is not, in itself, a sufficient justification for restricting
minors' fundamental rights more severely than the fundamental rights of adults.").
197. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989) ("[T]he decision to either stay inside or roam at night simply does not present the type of
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decisions to weigh. 19 8 There are two decisions that lead to nighttime violence. 199 First, there is the decision to leave one's home.20 0 Second,
there is the decision by a few to commit crimes. 20 1 These choices are separate and distinct; the decision to leave one's home after a certain hour
does not in itself lead to nighttime violence.2 0 2 Thus, a constitutional
analysis of the Curfew Act and other curfews should focus on the decision
to leave the home, and not on the decision to engage in criminal
20 3
activity.
In Bellotti, the juvenile choice at issue was whether a minor could
make an informed decision to have an abortion.2 0 4 The Court determined that minors could not make such a life-changing decision in an
informed manner. 20 5 Certainly, one could hardly argue that the maturity
required in deciding whether to leave one's home late at night is compara206
ble to the maturity required in deciding whether to have an abortion.
Clearly, such a decision does "not involve the kind of profound decisions
of concern in Bellotti."20 7 Thus, had the second Bellotti factor been approfound decision Bellotti would leave to the state."). But see In re People ex rel.

J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) ("[A] child's immaturity may lead to a decision to commit delinquent acts .... Although adults may also make these decisions, they are more likely to do so in an informed and mature manner with full
consideration of the consequences of their acts.").
198. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (focusing on decision of whether to
stay inside or roam at night), with People ex rel J.M., 768 P.2d at 223 (concentrating on decision to commit delinquent acts).
199. Compare Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (stressing decision to leave home),
with People ex rel. JM., 768 P.2d at 223 (stressing decision to commit criminal acts).
200. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (recognizing decision to leave home).
201. See People ex rel.JM., 768 P.2d at 223 (stressing decision to commit criminal acts).
202. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (finding that decision to engage in criminal activity is separate from decision to leave one's home after curfew).
203. See Beaumont, supra note 2, at 102 (noting issue is whether or not to
remain outside at night).
204. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (dealing with juveniles'

decision to have abortions).
205. See id. (assessing decision-making capacity ofjuveniles).
206. See id. (The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations ....
In sum, there are few situations in which
denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences
so grave and indelible."); see also Horowitz, supra note 150, at 384 ("The interest at
stake in Bellotti, the right of a female minor to decide to have an abortion, is vastly
different from the decision of a minor to go out at night.").
207. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating
that decision to roam at night or stay indoors does not equate to abortion decision
at issue in Bellotti); see also Horowitz, supra note 150, at 413 ("[The] presumption of
future immature behavior on the part of juveniles is an unwarranted extension of
the Bellotti rationale, because it implies that children are always too immature to
make positive choices, no matter how minor the decision or how trivial the
consequences.").
Alternatively, even if the second Bellotti factor were applied to the decision of
whether to commit a violent crime, it does not appear that juveniles are particularly susceptible to making bad decisions because less than one-fifth of all persons
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plied, as it was in Waters, the result would not have supported the differ20 8
ence in fundamental rights expressed by the Hutchins court.
Finally, the Curfew Act would have fared no better with the third Bellotti factor, which assesses the importance of the parental role in the juvenile actions at issue. 20 9 The Bellotti court found that states should
generally defer to parental control because children "are not . . . creatures] of the State; those who nurture [them] and direct [their] destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
[them] for additional obligations."2 10 In turn, the Bellotti court strengthened the position of parents by requiring their consent before a juvenile
211
could have an abortion.
Conversely, the Curfew Act has an opposite weakening effect because
it actually frustrates the parental role in many families.2 1 2 Rather than
requiring consent, the Curfew Act takes the decision-making ability away
from parents and it ignores the fact that, for thousands of families in the
District of Columbia, parental control is still highly effective. 213 For these
families, juvenile curfews result in a transfer of valuable parental rights to
the police and the state. 2 14 Thus, because the Curfew Act detracts from
charged with committing violent crimes in 1995 were juveniles. See SNYDER, supra
note 189, at 1-2 (1997) (summarizing statistics on juvenile arrest). Moreover, the
fact that less than one-half of one percent of all persons ages ten through seventeen were arrested for committing a violent crime in the same year seems to indicate that most juveniles make informed decisions about whether or not to commit
violent criminal acts. See id. (noting small percentage ofjuveniles involved in violent crime).
208. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (determining that same juvenile decision
involved in Hutchins did not satisfy second Bellotti factor).
209. See id. at 1137 (finding that curfew actually takes control away from
parents).
210. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925)).
211. See id. at 638 (requiring parental participation in decision-making
process).
212. Compare id. (requiring parents to help make decisions for juveniles), with
Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 534-35 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (allowing state, not parents, to decide whether juveniles leave their homes). See Toth, supra note 130, at
45 (positing that while curfews serve to assist parents in supervising their children,
they infringe upon rights of parents).
213. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534 (giving control to state by upholding curfew); see also Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (finding that juvenile curfew infringes
upon parental control).
214. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 ("As to these families [affected by the
Emergency Act and] struggling against the pressures of modern life, the [Emergency] Act gracelessly arrogates unto itself and to the police the precious rights of
parenthood."); see also Gerdes, supra note 150, at 407-08 ("It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535)); Chen, supranote 2, at
139-40 (arguing generally that curfews do not encourage family harmony and parental authority, but instead interfere with relationships between parents and
children).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/8

30

Poff: A Tale of Two Curfews (And One City): What Do Two Washington, D.C

2001]

COMMENT

307

parental power, it is contrary to the spirit of Bellotti.2 15 As a result, the
2 16
Curfew Act would have faltered under the third Bellotti factor.
In sum, the Bellotti factors are paramount in determining the scope of
juvenile fundamental rights. 2 17 When applied to juvenile curfews, they
provide a uniform test for determining whether a juvenile right is fundamental and thus deserves the same amount of protection as the adult
215. Compare Belotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (requiring parental consent), with Hutchins 188 F.3d at 534 (disregarding parental consent by upholding curfew). See
Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing rights of parents to provide their
children state-mandated level of education); see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (reinforcing Meyer holding); Privor, supra note 1, at 437 (noting that Bellotti plurality
found that promoting strong parental role is consistent with child's individual
liberty).
The Court has generally protected the rights of parents in raising their children. See Gerdes, supra note 150, at 407-09 (stating "The state's interest in assuring
that these choices are 'exercised as wisely as possible' is enhanced by requiring
parental participation. The Court's deference to parental authority has been a
consistent and central theme of minors' rights jurisprudence . . . " and positing
that most important part of Vernonia decision came when Justice Scalia described
minors' rights as "subject... to the control of their parents or guardians" (citing
Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) and
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995))).
216. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 (finding curfew frustrates parental role);
see also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39 (upholding regulation diminishing juvenile right,
but stressing that regulation was supportive of parental role); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that curfew interfered
with parental duties); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073-74 (5th
Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (finding ordinance inhibits parental role in child-rearing);
Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (finding curfew infringes upon parental functions); Lichtenbaum, supra note 92, at 698
("[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society." (citing Tona Trollinger, TheJuvenile Curfew:
UnconstitutionalImprisonment, 4 WM. & MARY BiLL RTs. J. 949, 997 (1996)); Chen,
supra note 2, at 132 ("One problem with courts' past treatment of youth curfews is
their lack of emphasis on the parent's role.").
One commentator who has examined the third Bellotti factor with regard to
juvenile curfews has stated the following:
[T] he third Bellotti factor, the importance of a parental role in child rearing, is not furthered by the enactment of a juvenile curfew. A juvenile
curfew does not promote the parental role, but rather inhibits it. The
ordinance does not give parents the power to make decisions concerning
the amount of freedom and responsibility they should give their children,
but instead exchanges this parental judgment with the presumed superior judgment of the state.
Lester, supra note 1, at 684. Furthermore, the ACLU has determined that curfews
interfere with the rights of parents. See Lourdes Rosado & Howard Manly, Keeping
Teens Off the Street: More Cities Try Curfews, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991 at 21 (describing position of ACLU).
217. See Lester, supra note 1, at 683 ("The Bellotti analysis allows a court to
determine if the particular characteristics of a child elevates this [state] interest to
the point where the state can restrict ajuvenile's activity, even though they cannot
restrict adults in the same manner.").
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equivalent.2 1 8 When the Bellotti factors are not applied, courts run the risk
of assessing rights without any semblance of central guidance. 21 9 This was
the case in the Waters and Hutchins decisions. 220 By applying the Bellotti
factors, the Waters court found that juveniles did have a fundamental right
on par with adults, and as a result, the court applied the strict scrutiny
standard to the Emergency Act.22 1 Conversely, by refusing to apply the
Bellotti factors, the Hutchins court operated without a central test and decided that juveniles, unlike adults, did not have a fundamental right to
free movement.2 22 In turn, it applied the intermediate scrutiny standard. 223 Predictably, the Emergency Act was struck down and the Curfew
2 24
Act was upheld.
Even if the Hutchins court had applied the Bellotti factors, the opposing outcomes may have still resulted. The Hutchins court made clear in
dicta that the Curfew Act would have survived strict scrutiny had it been
applied. 225 Nevertheless, if the Hutchins court had used the Bellotti factors,
found a juvenile fundamental right, applied strict scrutiny and upheld the
Curfew Act, then the only dispute would concern the weight of the government's interests and the methods of pursuing those interests. 226 Instead,
by ignoring the Bellotti factors, the Hutchins court only contributed to the
already overwhelming confusion over how to distinguish the fundamental
rights ofjuveniles from those of adults. 2 27 As a result, the Waters decision
exhibits the superior Fifth Amendment analysis.
218. See id. (noting that Bellotti allows juveniles to be treated differently than
adults when three factors are present).
219. See Horowitz, supra note 150, at 383 (recognizing that Supreme Court has
never expressly set out reliable guide for courts to appropriately weigh and evaluate minors' rights with regard to juvenile curfews).
220. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (basing conclusion on restrictive ordinances
aimed at specific juvenile actions rather than analysis of general juvenile curfews).
221. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1138-39 (applying strict scrutiny and finding
that curfew is not narrowly tailored).
222. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41 (finding juveniles do not have fundamental right of free movement).
223. See id. at 541-45 (applying intermediate scrutiny).
224. See id. at 548 (upholding Curfew Act); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1140 (finding Emergency Act unconstitutional). Like the Hutchins court, other courts have
also upheld a juvenile curfew under the intermediate scrutiny standard. See
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1018 (1999) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding curfew); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184-85 (D. Conn. 1999), appeal dismissed, 208 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).
225. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541 ("Even if the curfew implicated fundamental rights of children .. .it would survive heightened scrutiny.").
226. See id. at 541-45 (weighing government interest after determining proper
level of constitutional scrutiny); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139 (same).
227. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 537-38 (determining that juveniles have no fundamental right based on caselaw not pertaining to juvenile curfews).
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CONCLUSION

A comparison of the Hutchins and Waters decisions is revealing on two
levels. Initially, such an analysis shows that both the Hutchins and Waters
opinions display flawed, but constitutionally defensible First Amendment
conclusions. Moreover, it is clear that the Waters decision contains a superior Fifth Amendment application as a result of its application of the Bellotti factors.
More importantly, the comparison exposes the extent to which juvenile curfews confuse courts. When two courts face similar curfew ordinances directed at the same problems in the very same city and arrive at
opposing conclusions, the only reasonable explanation is a lack of guidance on the part of both courts. Until the Supreme Court provides lower
courts with more direction, the confusion exhibited in Waters and Hutchins
will continue to plague every municipality that seeks to invoke a juvenile

curfew.
Adam W Poff
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